There is ample evidence that human understanding of ordinary language relies in part on a rich capacity for imagistic mental modeling. We argue that genuine language understanding in machines will similarly require an imagistic modeling capacity enabling fast construction of instances of prototypical physical situations and events, whose participants are drawn from a wide variety of entity types, including animate agents. By allowing fast evaluation of predicates such as 'can-see', 'under', and 'inside', these model instances support coherent text interpretation. Imagistic modeling is thus a crucial -and not very broadly appreciated -aspect of the long-standing knowledge acquisition bottleneck in AI. We will illustrate how the need for imagistic modeling arises even in the simplest first-reader stories for children, and provide an initial feasibility study to indicate what the architecture of a system combining symbolic with imagistic understanding might look like.
Introduction
"Linguistic terms may not in the first place describe or represent meanings as such, but rather serve as triggers for activating concepts of human experience, which are far richer and more flexible than any lexical entry or formalization could possibly represent." -Thora Tenbrink
In AI, genuine language understanding is still thwarted by the knowledge acquisition (KA) bottleneck. Before we can overcome that formidable obstacle, whether by machine learning or other methods, we need at least to identify the kinds of knowledge representations required for understanding. While a great deal of AI research has addressed the question of what sorts of symbolic representations could support text comprehension, much less attention has been devoted to the potential role of mental imagery in that process, despite the insights from cognitive science noted above. This may be due in part to the frequently voiced idea that using internal three-dimensional models for comprehension would require an "inner eye" or Rylean humunculus. But this objection lacks cogency from an AI perspective, where the computational advantages of reasoning about the physical world with the aid of geometrical models and algorithms are well-established. (One of the earliest examples may be Scott Fahlman's work on reasoning about block stacking; see (Fahlman 1973).) In the following, we illustrate how the need for imagistic representations arises in even the simplest first-reader stories. We then outline an architecture for integrated symbolic and imagistic modeling and inference, applying this to the previously introduced motivating examples. As evidence for the feasibility of such an architecture, we illustrate the functioning of two essential components on which we have been working: a broad-coverage semantic parser that produces normalized, nonindexical logical forms from English, and a preliminary imagistic modeling system (IMS) that allows construction of simple spatial scenes and evaluation of spatial predicates such as 'can-see', 'under', and 'inside'. Much additional work will be required to bring this approach to fruition, but we contend that components of the type we have been constructing will be crucial to success in automating genuine language understanding.
Finally, we discuss related work on building imagistic models of text, and then reiterate our conclusions. The reported work does not in itself alleviate the KA bottleneck. On the contrary, we are arguing that the challenge is even larger than one might infer from most work on KA, which tends to treat the term as synonymous with acquisition of relational or rule-like knowledge. But in underscoring the need for extensive imagistic knowledge in story understanding, and outlining the possible form and use of such knowledge, we hope to be providing a better understanding of the challenges facing the natural language understanding community.
The Need for Imagistic Modeling
"The mechanisms that enable humans to tell, understand, and recombine stories separate human intelligence from that of other primates." -Patrick Winston (2011) The following is a simple story for beginning readers (from Lesson XXXI, Harris et al. 1889) :
One point where the need for imagistic modeling arises particularly clearly is at sentences 3 and 4. We know from the preceding two sentences that both Rosy and Frank see the nest. Yet it is clear from sentences 3 and 4 that they cannot see whether there are eggs in the nest -a fact needed to make sense of their subsequent dialogue and actions. In a purely symbolic approach, we might try to account for the visual occlusion of the eggs by means of an axiom stating that to see the contents of a topless container, one must be near it, with one's head above it. But there are problems with such an approach: First, the suggested axiom covers only a minor fraction of the unlimited number of ways in which occlusion can occur. To appreciate this point, consider the following (constructed) story fragments, where comprehension depends on a visual occlusion relation:
19. Rosy could not see the nest because of the thick foliage of the apple tree. 20. Jim hid from Frank behind a haystack. 21. With the curtains drawn, Ted did not notice the storm clouds gathering in the sky. 22. He finally found the "missing" glasses right under the newspaper in front of him. 23. Hoping to see the Milky Way, she stepped out of the house. 24. As he approached the mouse, it disappeared under the bed.
We noted that in order to see into a nest, the viewer should not only have a sufficiently high vantage point, but also be near the nest. This brings us to another problem with a purely symbolic approach: "Near" and "next to" relations are crucial to our understanding of many ordinary actions and situations, yet qualitative symbolic reasoning cannot in general tell us which of these relations hold in a specified situation. Again some simple examples suffice to indicate why understanding proximity relations is important in story understanding; the unnatural (b)-examples serve to draw attention to the proximity relations involved in the more natural (a)-examples: He quickly moved aside, grumbling. b. Sam heard the whir of a helicopter behind him as he walked down the trail.
#He quickly moved aside, grumbling. 27 a. Amy was walking her puppy. When it began to yelp, she quickly took it in her arms.
b. Amy was flying her kite. #When it began to careen, she quickly took it in her arms. Some of the examples also show that relative sizes and positions matter; clearly such examples can be multiplied indefintely. It is worth noting that proximity problems also arise in cognitive robotics, where a robot may need to anticipate whether it will be next to an object (e.g., a person, food tray or book) it plans to interact with, after one or more moves or other actions. The "next-to" problem was analyzed in (Schubert 1990 (Schubert , 1994 , and recent robotics research recognizes that cognitive robots need to construct three-dimensional spatial models of their environment (e.g., Roy et al. 2004) .
As final examples, we quote two more brief stories from a similar source as our first story, in which the need for modeling spatial relations is quite apparent:
A little girl went in search of flowers for her mother. It was early in the day, and the grass was wet. Sweet little birds were singing all around her. And what do you think she found besides flowers? A nest with young birds in it. While she was looking at them, she heard the mother bird chirp, as if she said, "Do not touch my children, little girl, for I love them In the first story, note the contrast with our opening story: We infer that the girl's attention is generally turned downward, perhaps by reference to the prototypical gaze direction of someone seeking objects on the ground. So the nest she spots is likely to be situated close to or on the ground, within a field of view lower than the girl's head. This is confirmed by her ability to look at the young birds, as well as by the mother bird's perception that the girl might touch them. In the second story, the prototypical configuration of a person holding a high-flying kite at the end of a long string, and the position of the sun high in the sky, are essential to understanding why the sun shines in the kite-flyer's eyes. Further, how the shade of a high fence might shield the kite-flyer from the sun, and why a dog under a cart may or may not be noticeable, are best understood from (at least rough) physical models of these entities.
Combining Linguistic and Imagistic Processing 3.1 Hybrid architecture
Examples like those above indicate the need for an imagistic modeling system (IMS) for modeling spatial relations, supporting a general symbolic understanding and reasoning system but using techniques that exploit the very special nature of spatial relationships and interactions of complex objects. We have in mind the kind of hybridization strategy that has been successfully pursued in logic-based systems and programming languages that allow for support by taxonomic, temporal, or arithmetic constraint solvers (e.g., Frisch 1990), and more broadly in specialist-supported reasoners such as that described in (Schubert et al. 1987) , or several of those in (Melis 1993) .
Clearly the IMS will have to include spatial prototypes for a very large number of ordinary natural objects and artifacts, their typical poses, and their typical positioning in relation to other objects (e.g., fruits on fruit trees, trees standing on the ground, people standing, sitting, lying down, etc., birds flying, nesting, or on branch, tables and chairs in a room, etc.) Further, we need means to assemble scenes ad hoc from such prototypes in accordance with verbal descriptions and symbolic knowledge, and crucially, means of "reading off" properties and relations from the assembled scenes. We consider the construction of such an IMS an important-and not very broadly appreciated-aspect of the knowledge acquisition bottleneck in AI.
Building a broad-coverage IMS will be a major challenge to the AI community, but we argue in the rest of the paper that it would indeed enable understanding of at least the simple kinds of stories we have used as examples. We do so by describing in some detail how semantic parsing, inference from background knowledge, and use of an IMS would interact in the processing of part of our opening story. The description is at least partially concrete, since we are well along in the construction a general semantic interpreter, have an inference engine that can reason with interpreted input and background knowledge, and have built a simple preliminary IMS. However, we do not yet have an integrated end-to-end story understanding system, or a significantly large set of prototypes.
Illustrating the process
We expect text understanding to proceed sentence-by-sentence, where the first step in sentence processing is semantic parsing. Our semantic parser can handle several of the simple stories we have looked at after some small adjustments. For example, We change Rosy's name to Rosie to prevent the Charniak parser from treating it as an adjective, and we change the question "Has the nest eggs in it, Frank?" to the American form "Does the nest have eggs in it, Frank?". After some automatic postprocessing of the parse tree, for example to mark prepositional phrases with their type and to insert traces for dislocated constituents, our semantic interpreter successively produces (i) an initial logical form (LF) by compositional rules; (ii) an indexical LF in which quantifiers and connectives are fully scoped and intrasentential anaphors are resolved; (iii) a deindexed LF with a speech act predicate and with explicit, temporally modified episodic (event or situation) variables; and (iv) a set of canonicalized formulas derived from the previous stage by Skolemization, negation scope narrowing, equality substitutions, separation of top-level conjuncts, and other operations. The following are the parse trees and the set of Episodic Logic formulas (Schubert & Hwang 2000) derived automatically from sentence (1) of our lead story:
(SPEAKER DIRECT-OH-TOWARDS*.V ROSIE.NAME), (NEST8.SK NEST.N), (NEST8.SK NEW-SALIENT-ENTITY*.N), (TREE9.SK ((NN APPLE.N) TREE.N)), ((SPEAKER ASK.V ROSIE.NAME (QNOM (YNQ (ROSIE.NAME SEE.V NEST8.SK)))) ** E7.SK), ((SPEAKER ASK.V ROSIE.NAME (QNOM (YNQ (ROSIE.NAME SEE.V (THAT (NEST8.SK IN.P TREE9.SK)))))) * E7.SK) Figure 1 : Scene created by IMS, allowing evaluation of query, "Can the children see eggs in the nest?"
Episodic Logic formulas, as used by the Epilog inference engine, are in infix form, i.e., the predicate follows the first (subject) argument. Also the unnamed objects referred to have been given Skolem names, such as TREE9.SK, and the corresponding type-predications, such as (TREE9.SK ((NN APPLE.N) TREE.N)), have been separated out. "Seeing the nest in the tree" has been approximated with the conjunction of "seeing the nest" and "seeing that the nest is in the tree"; correspondingly the speaker's question has been broken into two parts. YNQ is a yes-no question-forming operator (with intensional semantics) and QNOM is a reification operator mapping a question intension to an abstract individual. (Together, (QNOM (YNQ ...)) are equivalent to (WHETHER ...) .) The '**' and '*' operators respectively relate a sentence to a situation it characterizes, and a situation that it partially describes (see .
We could now use Epilog to infer that the speaker's question presupposes that the speaker sees the nest, and sees that it is in the tree, i.e., NEST8.SK is in fact in TREE9.SK, and hence it is (presumably) in the crown of TREE9.SK. The knowledge needed for the presupposition inference can be formally stated using the metasyntactic capabilities of Epilog; and the inference that the nest is in the crown of the tree would be based on the stereotyped knowledge (at first in symbolic form) that a nest in a tree is normally in the crown of the tree.
Additional stereotyped knowledge is needed before imagistic modeling can begin to contribute to understanding: Trees are generally outdoors and standing upright, rooted in the ground; persons who can see a small outdoor object (such as a nest) are typically outdoors as well and near the object; further, they are usually upright on the ground, unless we have reason to believe otherwise.
At this point, we can begin to generate a model scene: Two children, one called Rosie, are outdoors on the ground, near an apple tree with a nest in its crown, and they can see the nest. (That the persons are children is a meta-inference from the genre of the book the story is taken from.) Our preliminary IMS can accept these assertions (stated as formal predications) and build a corresponding scene. The object prototypes ensure that the size relationships will be reasonably realistic.
Processing of sentences 3 and 4 leads to the inference that Rosie and Frank do not know for certain whether there are eggs in the nest. Technically, Rosie's not knowing this is an implicature of her question, (3) , and Frank's not knowing this is an implicature of his phrasing I think ... in (4).
We assume that when a story raises the possibility that a certain object is in the current scene, the IMS will model the presence of that object (but flagging it as hypothetical). Thus at least one (hypothetical) egg will be placed in the nest. We also assume that the interpretive algorithm continually checks the plausibility of propositions newly inferred from the text -in this case, the plausibility of the inference that Rosie and Frank do not know for certain whether there are eggs in the nest. Using the knowledge that if a person can see an object at a certain place, then they know it is there (equivalently, if they don't know about the presence of an object, they can't see it), the algorithm would query the IMS about the visibility of the egg by the children. Evaluation of the "can-see" predicate would confirm that the children probably cannot see the (hypothetical) egg in the nest, confirming the plausibility of the inference that motivated the check. In this way, coherence of the current interpretation of the story is maintained, and that is an essential aspect of deep understanding.
While our implementation has not gone beyond this point, further symbolic story processing at sentence (5) would lead to the inference that Frank will end up in the crown of the apple tree if he climbs it, and by modeling this future situation we could confirm his expectation expressed by sentence (6), again using "can-see". Sentence (7) verifies the (tentative) inference that Frank carried out the intention expressed in sentence (5), and sentence (8) confirms both Frank's expectation and the model's prediction. We hope it is clear that sentences (12-16) can be tackled in a similar way.
Imagistic Modeling System
Our modeling environment used the Blender system (www.Blender.org), a free Gnu software system for designing and rendering complex 3D scenes. It provides a means of easily creating object models, attaching properties and constraints to those models, and performing operations in a 3D space. Blender is primarily written in python and supports native development of python scripts using its API. Python modules executed in the Blender scripting environment may access and manipulate object information in real time.
Based on input from our inference engine, the specialist constructs a 3D model for given entities and relations derived from a portion of a story describing some situation. This model may then be queried by the inference engine for spatial relations in the scene, such as 'Can-See', 'Near', 'Under', 'In', and 'Within'. Both placement and querying rely primarily on computed acceptance areas (AAs -in general 3D regions) in the vicinity of objects. Entities are obtained as instances of object prototypes in a database, stored in the form of 3D Blender files and XML trees. Each object is comprised of a series of part models arranged relative to an empty parent object. Default poses and configurations are also stored for objects, and these are invoked with a certain probability given that instances of all objects in a configuration are in the scene. For example, a scene with a set of chairs and a table might be automatically arranged such that the chairs encircle the table.
We use Scene, Entity, and Predication classes to represent information about story scenes. Each Scene models an individual story scene, and contains pointers to the Entity and Predication objects represented in the scene model. Entity instances contain a pointer to the Blender object representing the entity as well as methods for drawing and manipulating the object, and pointers to all predications relevant to the entity's parameters. A Predication is an instantiated spatial predicate applied to particular argument entities and includes methods imported from the predicate library. Each predicate in the predicate library has two distinct functions, one for object placement and the other for querying. Both are based on associated functions that compute AAs for parameterized 3D objects, drawing on a sublibrary of primitive spatial operations.
For object placement, an AA is represented as a tuple of maximum and minimum values for the x, y, and z dimensions. For example, suppose that an object A whose maximum dimension is 1.0 bu (Blender units) is specified as being near a second object B whose maximum dimension is 2.0 bu, and object B is located at (2, 2, 0) . A reasonable AA for placing A based on the predication [A near B] might then be: ((-1,5) , (-1,5) , (-3,3) ). This area would be randomly sampled to determine A's modeled location.
Each query function returns a numerical value ranging from 0 to 1 depending on how well the predication is satisfied. Widely different approaches are used to query predications depending on which predicate is instantiated. 'Near', for example, performs a simple calculation depending on object sizes and distance from one another. 'Under' generates a temporary block representing its AA and returns a value depending on what proportion of the second object's volume intersects this block. A rejection technique based on predicate querying is also used to aid in object placement. After AA bounds are determined and an object is placed, predications affected by its parameters are queried. If any of these returns a value of 0, the object is placed again.
So far, we have built and tested 39 object types and 8 predicates. This is not a large number, but is enough to convince us that with many more objects (with multiple "poses" for deformable ones, and arranged in various typical configurations with other objects), and a few more predicates, we would be able to model a wide range of scenes in realistic first-reader stories.
Related Work
Existing research in qualitative spatial reasoning emphasizes the utility of acceptance areas and qualitative variance in predicate meanings as a function of object shape and size (Hernández 1994 , Hernández et al. 1995 , Clementini et al. 1997 , Cohn 1997 , Mukerjee et al. 2000 , Cohn & Hararika 2001 , Tappan 2004 . Kadir et al. (2011) use Blender as their basis for modeling scenes from natural language input, utilizing similar methods to object placement as ours. WordsEye is a powerful text-to-scene conversion system capable of modeling complex visual scenes based on layers of spatial predications (Coyne & Sproat 2001 , Coyne et al. 2010a , Coyne et al. 2010b ). However, existing text-to-scene conversion systems such as this differ crucially from ours in that they are designed only for predicate-based scene construction and not for querying.
A Master's thesis by J. R. Bender (2001) connects simple sentences, interpreted in terms of Jackendoffian primitives, with rough 3D prism-based models; it is able to answer questions such as whether the butter on a toast is above the plate, where the toast has been stated to be on the plate. This work partially anticipates ours, though it did not tackle real stories, and we think that the kinds of visual predicates considered could rather easily be handled symbolically (e.g., with transitivity axioms), unlike those we implemented, such as can see. In related work, Finlayson and Winston (2007) showed how a game engine could be used to model a motion trajectory in a sentence about a pigeon, and to extract a part of the trajectory not explitly described. They mention that many common objects are modeled by game engines, an observation we also made at the beginning of our work; but adding the kinds of evaluable predicates to existing game engines that are needed for story understanding turned out to be far more difficult than using the Blender API to develop our own script-based modeling system. Soar's Spatial and Visual System (SVS) (Wintermute 2009 ) is conceptually similar to the IMS. Predicate-specified AAs are used to create an imagistic scene representation, which can be then used to query further predicates. SVS differs from our system in that it is built to model only very simple scenes and is not designed to handle linguistic input (Wintermute 2010 ).
Conclusion
The very simple, but genuine, first-reader stories we looked at illustrated the need for spatial knowledge about humans, ordinary objects, and their typical poses and configurations in story understanding. We showed with a detailed example how such knowledge could be used to support construction of a coherent interpretation by a symbolic interpretive algorithm. The spatial models for this purpose need not be as fine-grained as those intended for creating realistic, pleasing 3D scenes. But the number of ordinary object types is very large, and their typical kinds of configurations even larger. Thus developing a large imagistic knowledge base should be considered an important challenge by the NLU community. Indeed, the more or less static modeling we have focused on needs to be supplemented eventually with subtle dynamic modeling, as is evident if one considers questions such as If you throw a cream pie in someone's face, what happens to the pie and the face?, or popular quips about activities that any "truly wise man" should avoid, such as playing leapfrog with a unicorn, standing barefoot behind Grandpa's rocking chair, or skipping rope under a ceiling fan.
1 Johnston & Williams' (2008) "molecular" models, which they integrate with tableaux-based reasoning, are interesting candidates for dynamic simulation, if they can be effectively used for construction of linguistically described situations, and evaluation of linguistically relevant predicates in these situations.
